Employment law

African Cotton Industries Ltd v Wanjiru [2026] KEELRC 15025 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal 215 of 2023
Judgment date
6 November 2026
Judge(s)
Abuodha Nelson Jorum

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Background

Through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 13th October, 2023 the Appellant appeals against entire judgement of Hon. Rawlings Liluma, SRM. delivered on 15th September, 2023.The Appeal was based on the grounds that:

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Question before the court

On the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in the reliefs granted, Counsel submitted that upon finding that the Respondent’s termination of employment was unfair and unlawful, the Trial Court awarded the Respondent a total sum of Kshs. 537,500/-, comprising one month’s salary in lieu of notice, unpaid salary for the period June 2020 to June 2021, compensation equivalent to six months’ salary for unfair termination and severance pay.…

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Decision / orders

In conclusion the Appeal succeeds in part as follows:

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Reasoning passage

In this case, this court agrees with the trial court that the Appellant did not follow the right procedure in declaring the Respondent redundant. First, I cannot find evidence on record that the Respondent was served a copy of the redundancy notice. As for the Labour Office, the Appellant, at page 94 of the record of appeal, relies on a printout of an email, addressed to one Mr. Didmas, described as “Labour Officer, Athi River” email…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. 215 OF 2023

AFRICAN COTTON INDUSTRIES LIMITED…….……...APPELLANT

-VERSUS-

POLYN WAITHERA WANJIRU…….……………………. RESPONDENT

(Being an Appeal from the Judgement and Decree of CMEL CASE NO E1506 OF 2021 by Hon Rawlings Liluma SRM on 15th September 2023)

JUDGMENT

1. Through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 13th October, 2023 the Appellant appeals against entire judgement of Hon. Rawlings Liluma, SRM. delivered on 15th September, 2023.The Appeal was based on the grounds that:

i. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the termination of the Respondent’s employment herein was unfair, unjust and unlawful when there was overwhelming uncontroverted evidence that the Appellant had acted within the strict confines of the law in that regard.

ii. The learned Trial Magistrate in law and in fact in holding that the Appellant did not adduce evidence to demonstrate its difficult financial situation that warranted the decision to make the employees proceed on unpaid leave, without considering the submissions of the Appellant and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture & Technology v Kwanza Estate limited delivered on 16th June 2023.

iii. The learned Trial Court erred in law and m fact in failing to consider the weighty defence by the Appellant by taking into consideration the circumstances that led to the termination of the Respondent's employment including the operation of the doctrine of frustration of contract.

iv. The learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the Appellant had acted in blatant disregard of the law with regard to the substance and procedure of the redundancy measures it employed, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary including the satisfaction of all the requirements of communication to the employee and the redundancy notice dated 30th June 2021 and the letter to the labour Office on the same.

v. The Learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to hold that the actions of the Appellant were necessitated by the unforeseen events at the time which were no secret to anybody i.e., the advent of the covid 19 pandemic and the resultant adverse effects on businesses especially since these had been communicated to the Appellant· s employees.

vi. The learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the Appellant had breached any laws at all in its conduct towards the Respondent and that the Respondent was entitled to the colossal sum of Kshs. 562,5001=.

vii. The learned Trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in its holding on all items of the reliefs the Respondent was entitled to considering that the Respondent rendered no services to the Appellant during the time she was away from work as a result of the pandemic and that the Appellant had no way of sustaining us business at the time.

viii. The teamed Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that and in failing to consider the future adverse effects of its pronouncement on the Appellant

ix. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in disregarding the evidence adduced by the Appellant in support of his defence and in disregarding the submissions and the authorities cited by the Appellant

x. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact deciding the case against the weight of the evidence and contrary to applicable legal principles.

2. The Appellant prayed that the Appeal be allowed, the Judgment and decree dated 15th September 2023 be set aside and substituted with a Judgment dismissing the Respondent’s Claim and allowing the Appellant’s defence, with costs.

3. The Appeal was disposed of by written submissions.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS.

4. The Appellant’s Advocates Gaita & Company Advocates filed written submissions dated 22nd May, 2026 and on the issue of whether the Appellant acted within the confines of section 40 of the Employment Act, Counsel submitted that the trial Court erred in finding that the Appellant had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 40 of the Employment Act. It was submitted that, at pages 147 to 149 of the Record of Appeal, the trial Court faulted the Appellant for failing to avail evidence of financial difficulties, failing to issue notice to the labour office and failing to afford the Respondent an opportunity to be heard.

5. On the allegation that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate the financial difficulties that led to the redundancy, Counsel submitted that in 2020 the world was faced with the COVID-19 pandemic which handicapped the normal running of businesses, and the Appellant was no exception. In June 2020, the Appellant communicated its efforts to retain its committed workforce, but this had resulted in a decline in revenue and reduction in operations, as shown at page 78 of the Record of Appeal. The Respondent was made aware of the Appellant’s financial situation, following which she proceeded on leave. The unchanged situation was subsequently communicated to her. Reference was made to pages 79 to 86 of the Record of Appeal, which communications the Respondent admitted during cross-examination at page 137.

6. The Appellant’s witness, at page 141 of the Record of Appeal, informed the trial Court that although the Appellant continued with its business, it was not operating at optimum capacity and purchasing power had reduced. Counsel relied on the case of Kenya Airline Pilots Association v Kenya Airways Public Limited, where the Court held that an employer undergoing a financial crisis is entitled to make a commercial judgment on the best action to take in order to remain commercially viable, including reduction of its workforce and fleet. Counsel submitted that the testimony of the Appellant’s witness was material and probative as it established that the Appellant had suffered a decline in business operations and reduction of work. The separation of employees therefore arose from economic and organisational circumstances under the doctrine of frustration, and the Respondent was constantly made aware of the same. Counsel consequently submitted that the trial Court erred in holding that the Appellant had not availed evidence of financial hardship.

7. On the issue of whether the Appellant issued notice to the labour office, Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s witness admitted at page 140 of the Record of Appeal that notice had been issued to the labour office as required by the Act. Evidence of the notice was produced at page 94 of the Record of Appeal. It was submitted that the trial Court, at page 148, disregarded the Appellant’s testimony and evidence without giving reasons for doing so. Counsel contended that, at the very least, the trial Court ought to have given reasons for disregarding and/or discrediting the Appellant’s testimony and evidence.

8. On the issue of whether the Respondent was entitled to a hearing under Section 41 of the Employment Act, Counsel submitted that the termination arose from redundancy caused by operational and financial restructuring under Section 40 of the Employment Act. The separation was therefore not founded on misconduct or poor performance to warrant the requirements contemplated under Section 41 of the Act. Counsel submitted that the trial Court therefore erred in faulting the Appellant for failing to offer the Respondent an opportunity to be heard and make any presentations or representations she may have had.

9. On the issue of compliance with the requirements of Section 40 of the Employment Act, Counsel submitted that Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the Appeal ought to succeed as due process under Section 40 had been adhered to. This was shown by the one-month notice issued prior to termination at page 93 of the Record of Appeal and the breakdown of the tabulations dated 5th August 2021 at page 95, which included pay in lieu of notice, severance pay, leave pay and salary arrears.

10. On the issue of whether the Appellant adduced evidence of its financial situation which led to its decision to place employees on unpaid leave, Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s evidence showed that the unpaid leave arrangements were purely temporary, as shown by the communications at pages 79 to 86 of the Record of Appeal. The measures were undertaken at a time of an unprecedented global public health and economic emergency. The governmental containment measures severely disrupted business operations, revenue streams and workforce deployment across all sectors of the economy. Counsel submitted that the Appellant acted in good faith and intended to preserve employment relationships and avert the immediate closure of its business operations or mass redundancies. Counsel therefore urged the Court to allow Ground 2 of the Appeal.

11. On the issue of whether the Respondent was entitled to the reliefs awarded despite rendering no services during the pandemic, Counsel submitted that at page 149 of the Record of Appeal, the trial Court awarded the Respondent Kshs. 325,000/- being salary from June 2020 to June 2021, although the Respondent did not work during that period as she was on unpaid leave through no fault of either party. The trial Court further awarded the Respondent Kshs. 150,000/- as compensation for unfair termination, being six months’ salary.

12. On the issue of whether the circumstances brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic ought to have been considered in assessing the reliefs, Counsel submitted that while the Court may find that certain statutory or contractual dues remained payable by the Appellant, the extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic ought to have been considered as mitigating factors in the assessment of remedies. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s measures were intended to preserve the continuity of the business and safeguard employment relationships to the extent reasonably possible. The Court was therefore urged to exercise its discretion judiciously and decline to award salary for months not worked together with compensatory damages under Section 49 of the Employment Act. Grounds 7 and 8 of the Appeal should therefore succeed.

RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS

13. The Respondent’s Advocates, Clifford Odhiambo & Company Advocates filed written submissions dated 2nd June, 2026 and on the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the Respondent’s termination of employment on account of redundancy was unfair and unlawful, Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s case before the Trial Court was that the Respondent’s employment had been terminated on account of redundancy and that the termination was just and lawful and that section 40(1)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act, 2007 required an employer to issue prior written notice of the intended redundancy to the affected employee personally, or to the relevant trade union where the employee is a member. Reliance was placed on Thomas De La Rue (K) Ltd v David Opondo Omutelema [2013] eKLR, where the Court stated that Sections 40(a) and 40(b) provide for two different kinds of redundancy notifications depending on whether the employee is or is not a member of a trade union. Where the employee is a member of a union, the notification is to the union and the local labour officer at least one month before the effective redundancy date, while where the employee is not a member of the union, the notification must be in writing and to the employee and the local labour office.

14. Counsel submitted that it followed that the Appellant was under a strict statutory obligation to issue a written notice of the intended redundancy to both the Respondent and the local Labour Office at least one month before the effective date of the redundancy. He submitted that the Appellant failed to discharge this duty. The Appellant did not produce before the Trial Court evidence showing that a redundancy notice had been issued to the Respondent or that the Labour Office had been notified. Instead, the Appellant produced a printout of an email as proof of compliance with the statutory requirement, as shown at page 94 of the Record of Appeal.

15. Counsel referred to the email which stated that the redundancy notices were attached as an advance copy for reference and acknowledgement and that physical copies would be dispatched to the offices the following day. It was submitted that nothing prevented the Appellant from producing copies of the alleged redundancy notices referred to in the email.

16. Counsel further submitted that the purported email printout was questionable and appeared doctored. He pointed out that it lacked a time stamp and did not sufficiently identify the alleged recipient as a Labour Officer. He submitted that the authenticity of the notice could therefore not be verified and it could not be ascertained whether it was ever sent to the Labour Office as required by law. The purported email printout could therefore not be relied upon as proof of compliance with the statutory requirements to redundancy.

17. Counsel submitted that in the absence of such evidence, the Learned Trial Magistrate was correct in finding that the Respondent’s termination of employment was unfair, unjust and unlawful. He further relied on Section 45(2)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007, which provides that termination of employment by an employer is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the termination was carried out in accordance with a fair procedure. Counsel submitted that the provision places the evidential and legal burden upon the employer to demonstrate compliance with fair procedure, which burden the Appellant wholly failed to discharge.

18. Counsel relied on Irungu v Tonde & another (Cause E362 of 2020) [2026] KEELRC 1161 (KLR), where the Court, quoting the decision in Francis Kamau v Lee Construction [2014] eKLR, held that where an employer declares a redundancy, the conditions set out in Section 40 of the Employment Act must be observed and where the employer fails to do so, the termination becomes unfair within the meaning of Section 45 of the Employment Act. He also relied on Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 others [2014] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that termination of employment on account of redundancy is justified if there is substantive justification for declaring redundancy and procedural fairness in the consequent retrenchment.

19. Counsel submitted that, based on the foregoing authorities, the Trial Court correctly found that the Respondent’s termination of employment on account of redundancy was unfair within the meaning of Section 45 of the Employment Act, 2007, due to the Appellant’s non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 40 of the Act, particularly the failure to issue the requisite statutory redundancy notice to the Respondent.

20. Counsel further submitted that instead of complying with the mandatory legal procedure, the Appellant repeatedly placed the Respondent on unpaid leave through various letters, as shown at pages 78, 79, 81, 83, 85, 89 and 93 of the Appellant’s Record of Appeal dated 11th October 2024. He contended that this subjected the Respondent to prolonged uncertainty, financial hardship and mental anguish for over one year. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s conduct demonstrated that the purported redundancy was neither procedural nor fair, but was a drawn-out and unlawful termination disguised as redundancy. He therefore submitted that the Learned Trial Magistrate properly found that the Respondent’s termination was unfair, unjust and unlawful.

21. On the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in the reliefs granted, Counsel submitted that upon finding that the Respondent’s termination of employment was unfair and unlawful, the Trial Court awarded the Respondent a total sum of Kshs. 537,500/-, comprising one month’s salary in lieu of notice, unpaid salary for the period June 2020 to June 2021, compensation equivalent to six months’ salary for unfair termination and severance pay. Counsel referred to page 150 of the Appellant’s Record of Appeal dated 11th October 2024.

22. Counsel relied on Ken Freight (E.A.) Limited v Benson K. Nguti, SC Pet. No. 37 of 2018 [2019] eKLR, where the Court held that once a trial Court finds that termination of employment was wrongful or unfair, the remaining question is the appropriate remedy. The Court further held that Section 49 of the Employment Act provides a number of remedies for unlawful or wrongful termination and it is for the Judge to exercise discretion in determining whether to allow any or all of the remedies provided.

23. Counsel submitted that the Trial Court, having found that the Respondent’s employment was unfair, had the duty to determine the appropriate reliefs. It was his submission that the Trial Court, in line with Section 49 of the Employment Act, properly exercised its discretion in awarding the Respondent Kshs. 537,500/-.

24. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the judgment of the Learned Magistrate was sound, well-reasoned.

DETERMINATION.

25. The court has considered the record of appeal, the detailed submissions filed by the both parties herein as well as the authorities and notes that the decision of the trial court was that judgment was entered in favour of the Claimant as follows: -

(a) One month’s pay in lieu of notice – Kshs. 25,000/=;

(b) Unpaid salary from the month of June 2020 to June 2021 – Kshs. 325,000/=;

(c) Compensation for six months’ unfair termination – Kshs. 150,000/=; and

(d) Severance pay – Kshs. 37,500/=.

26. The Appellant was aggrieved by the Judgment and challenges the decision of the trial Court finding that the Respondent’s termination was unfair and unlawful, its position being that the termination was on account of redundancy arising from the financial difficulties occasioned by the Covid 19 pandemic and that it had complied with Section 40 of the Employment Act. The Appellant also challenges the award of unpaid salary for the period the Respondent was on unpaid leave, on the argument that she did not render any services, as well as the award for compensation for unfair termination.

27. The Appellant fronted 10 grounds in its Memorandum of Appeal, which this Court will condense into two issues for determination as follows:-

i. WhetherWhether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent’s termination on account of redundancy was unfair and unlawful.

ii. WHEHWWwWhetherWhetherWheWhether the trial court erred in awarding the Respondent the reliefs sought.

Whether the Respondent’s termination on account of redundancy was unfair and unlawful

28. It is not in dispute that the Respondent was terminated on account of redundancy. Section 2 of the Employment Act provides as follows on the meaning of redundancy: -

“…means the loss of employment, occupation, job or career by involuntary means through no fault of an employee, involving termination of employment at the initiative of the employer, where the services of an employee are superfluous and the practices commonly known as abolition of office, job or occupation and loss of employment…”

29. It is well recognized that an employer may terminate an employee’s employment on account of redundancy, provided the requirements set out under section 40 of the Employment Act are met. It is also equally settled that termination on account of redundancy must, like any other termination, meet the requirements of both substantive and procedural fairness under section 43 of the Employment Act. In Kenya Airways Limited VS. Aviation and Allied Workers Union of Kenya and 3 Others (2014) eKLR, the Court of Appeal pronounced itself as follows:

“Thus, redundancy is a legitimate ground for terminating a contract of employment provided there is a valid and fair reason based on operational requirements of the employer and the termination is in accordance with a fair procedure.  As Section 43(2) provides, the test of what is fair reason is subjective.  The phrase “based on operational requirements of the employer” must be construed in the context of the statutory definition of redundancy.

What the phrase means, in my view, is that while there be underlying causes leading to a time redundancy situation such as reorganization, the employer must nevertheless show that the termination is attributable to redundancy – that is that the services of the employee has been rendered superfluous or that redundancy has resulted in abolition of office, job or loss of employment.”

30. According to the Appellant, sometime in June 2020, its business was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and experienced financial difficulties, consequently, on 30th June 2021, decided to declare the Respondent’s position redundant. The Respondent disputed this and stated that throughout the proceedings, the Appellant had not demonstrated how COVID-19 affected its operations.

31. This Court is sympathetic to the challenges faced by businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court cannot assume and under Section 43(1) of the Employment Act, the burden was on the Appellant to prove that it did in fact suffer financial difficulties.

32. I am guided by the case of Daniel Mburu Muriu v Hygrotech East Africa Ltd [2021] KEELRC 316 (KLR) it was held as follows;

“There is no evidence from the Respondent to confirm that it was experiencing financial difficulties. The Respondent would have done this by way of producing audited financial statements to dislodge the allegation by the Claimant. In the circumstances, this court is satisfied and holds that there was no good, lawful, or reasonable basis for the Respondent to declare the Claimant redundant.

Under Section 43 of the Act the Respondent as the employer is under obligation to prove the reason(s) for termination and that the same was lawful under Section 45 of the Act. As stated above, the Respondent did not adduce evidence to demonstrate the alleged difficult financial situation at the material time. In the circumstances this court finds and holds that the termination of the Claimant was malicious, unfair, unjust, and unlawful.”

33. Similarly, this court, in Thomas & Piron Grand Lacs Limited v Momanyi (Appeal E097 of 2023) [2024] KEELRC 2186 (KLR) (6 September 2024) (Judgment) finding on this exact issue held as follows;

“From the above, it is clear the reason has to be valid and a fair procedure has to be followed. In this case the Appellant stated that it was going through financial difficulties due to Covid-19 pandemic. However, the Appellant did not adduce evidence such as its financial statements to illustrate that it was going through financial difficulties. This reason therefore fails the validity test under section 43 of the Employment Act.”

34. I have perused the record of appeal and I cannot find any document to support the Appellant’s claim. Even the Appellant’s witness, one Francis Ogolla admitted during cross examination that the Appellant had not produced any evidence to show that the business was financially constrained. Therefore the court is inclined to agree with the trial Court that the Appellant had not satisfied it that there was a good, lawful and reasonable reason to declare the Respondent redundant. It is also for that reason that the Appellant’s reliance on the doctrine of frustration failed.

35. Regarding procedural fairness, under Section 40 of the Employment Act, an employer terminating an employee’s employment on account of redundancy must follow a fair procedure. Section 40 of the employment Act provides as follows:

(1) An employer shall not terminate a contract of service on account of redundancy unless the employer complies with the following conditions—

a. where the employee is a member of a trade union, the employer notifies the union to which the employee is a member and the labour officer in charge of the area where the employee is employed of the reasons for, and the extent of, the intended redundancy not less than a month prior to the date of the intended date of termination on account of redundancy;

b. where an employee is not a member of a trade union, the employer notifies the employee personally in writing and the labour officer;

c. the employer has, in the selection of employees to be declared redundant had due regard to seniority in time and to the skill, ability and reliability of each employee of the particular class of employees affected by the redundancy;

d. where there is in existence a collective agreement between an employer and a trade union setting out terminal benefits payable upon redundancy; the employer has not placed the employee at a disadvantage for being or not being a member of the trade union;

e. the employer has where leave is due to an employee who is declared redundant, paid off the leave in cash;

f. the employer has paid an employee declared redundant not less than one month’s notice or one month’s wages in lieu of notice; and

g. the employer has paid to an employee declared redundant severance pay at the rate of not less than fifteen days pay for each completed year of service.

36. In this case, this court agrees with the trial court that the Appellant did not follow the right procedure in declaring the Respondent redundant. First, I cannot find evidence on record that the Respondent was served a copy of the redundancy notice. As for the Labour Office, the Appellant, at page 94 of the record of appeal, relies on a printout of an email, addressed to one Mr. Didmas, described as “Labour Officer, Athi River” email address wakhayadis@gmail.com However, there is nothing on record to prove that the email address is an official email of the Labour Office or that Mr. Didmas is an officer there. Had the Appellant attached a copy of the notice, stamped, it would have removed any doubt. In the circumstances, I find that the Appellant did not issue notices of the intended redundancy in violation of Section 40 of the Employment Act.

37. Further to the above finding, the court notes that the Appellant also failed to conduct consultations. It is well settled now that consultation is very crucial in the redundancy process and failure by the Respondent to meet this requirement faults the procedural requirement. 

38. The Court of Appeal in the case of The German School Society & another v Ohany & another (Civil Appeal 325 & 342 of 2018 (Consolidated)) [2023] KECA 894 (KLR) (24 July 2023) (Judgment) held at paragraphs 56, 57 and 60: -

“56.A notice to the employee/trade union/labour officer opens up the door for a consultative process with the key stakeholders. The Court of Appeal in Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 Others (2014) eKLR held:

a) Consultation is implicit in the Employment Act under the principle of fair play;

b) Consultation gives an opportunity for other avenues to be considered to avert or to minimize the adverse effects of terminations;

c) Consultations are meant for the parties to put their heads together and is imperative under Kenyan law;

d) Consultations have to be a reality not a charade;

e) Opportunity must be given for the stakeholders to consider;

f) Stakeholders must have and keep an open mind to listen to suggestions, consider them properly and then only then decide what is to be done; and

g) Consultation must not be cosmetic.

57.In essence, consultation is an essential part of the redundancy process and ensures that there is substantive fairness. The employer should ensure that it carries out the process as fair as possible and that all mitigating factors are taken into consideration. A reading of the record shows that the respondent was served with a redundancy notice and asked to proceed for a one month’s leave. The trial court found that the redundancy was unfair and irregular for failure to give adequate notice and thereby not giving consultation a chance.

60. However, on the question whether the notice gave consultations and dialogue a chance, we find that while the requirement for consultation is not expressly provided for in section 40 of the Employment Act, this requirement is implied, as the main reason and rationale for giving the notices in section 40(1) (a) and (b) to the unions and employees of an impending redundancy where applicable.”

39. The requirement for consultation was therefore not met.

40. Regarding the selection criteria, there is no evidence of the criteria the Appellant applied in selecting the Respondent for termination. No evaluation report was furnished. I turn to the case of Cammish v. Parliamentary Service where the New Zealand Chief Judge succinctly expressed this point as follows: -

“From the above provisions and decisions, the requirements in fulfilling the threshold set by section 40(1)(c) of the Employment Act can therefore be surmised as follows. First, an employer should include the factors set out in section 40(1)(c) of the Employment Act in the criteria for evaluating and selecting the employees to be declared redundant. Second, the employer is required to prove that the criteria was objectively, uniformly and fairly applied. The Appellant has in this respect relied on a report titled ‘Job Evaluation Report’ dated November 2014 undertaken by its consultants, who also gave evidence in the trial Court. The Appellant argues that the said report stated the criteria for selection for redundancy.”

41. It is evident that the selection criteria as per the act of first in last out was not provided for in this case. Consequently, I find that the trial magistrate did not err in finding that the Appellant acted in blatant disregard of Section 40 of the Employment Act.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding the Respondent the reliefs sought.

42. I now turn to the issue of the compensation for unfair termination. Undeniably, the award was made under the provisions of section 49[1][c] of the Act. The learned Trial Magistrate awarded the Respondent a sum of Kshs 150,000 being compensation for 6 months. On this issue, I am satisfied with the trial Court’s reasons being that the Respondent had been unfairly terminated, that the termination was not of her own making and that she had worked for the Appellant for close to three years. It is clear from those reasons that the Learned Magistrate considered the relevant factors in arriving at the award. I therefore find no basis for interfering with the award.

Unpaid Leave

43. On the award of unpaid leave. The record shows that the decision to send the Respondent on unpaid leave was decided by the Appellant. Between 8th June 2020 to 30th June 2021, the Appellant sent the Respondent on unpaid leave allegedly due to the Covid 19 pandemic. The record reflects that the Respondent did agree and sign the first notice sending her on 3 months’ leave, but there is no evidence of her consent or any consultation to the subsequent ones dated 4th September 2020, 24th December 2020, 27th March 2021, 29th April 2021 and 29th May 2021. Meaning that between 9th August 2020 2020 and 30th June 2021, the Respondent remained in employment but without pay.

44. It is trite that where a decision is made affecting an employee’s contract or where there is a unilateral change in employment terms, there must be evidence of consultations with the affected employee. In this case, no such evidence has been provided. I am guided by the Court of Appeal case of Bins (Nairobi) Services Limited v Hardard Macharia Kariamburi (Civil Appeal E670 of 2024) [2025] KECA 1726 (KLR) (24 October 2025) (Judgment).

45. The law is clear that the salary of an employee is protected as of right under the Employment Act. Therefore, the Respondent is entitled to recover the salary that was withheld from her but only as from 9th August 2020 when it was clear that she was unlawfully sent on unpaid leave. The court notes that the trial court awarded the salary as from June 2020, I will interfere, exclude the first 3 months, leaving the sum of Kshs. 250,000.

46. The awards for 1 month salary in lieu of notice and severance pay were not challenged and are accordingly upheld.

47. In conclusion the Appeal succeeds in part as follows:

i. The award One month’s pay in lieu of notice – Kshs. 25,000 is upheld;

ii. The award for Unpaid salary is recalculated from the month of August 2020 to June 2021 – Kshs. 275,000/=;

iii. Compensation for six months’ unfair termination – Kshs. 150,000/= is upheld; and

iv. Severance pay – Kshs. 37, 500 is upheld.

48. Each party shall bear its own costs.

49. It is so ordered.

Dated at Nairobi this 6th day of November, 2026

Delivered virtually this 6th day of November, 2026

Abuodha Nelson Jorum

Presiding Judge-Appeals Division.

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